Rivista Orizzonti del Diritto CommercialeISSN 2282-667X
G. Giappichelli Editore

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The new EU monetary and fiscal policy: an international discussion (di Jens-Hinrich Binder, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen Enrico Letta, SciencesPo Niamh Moloney, London School of Economics Giulio Tremonti, Università degli Studi di Pavia edited by Andrea Perrone and Giuliana Scognamiglio)


CONTENUTI CORRELATI: politica monetaria - politica fiscale

Q. The non-conventional monetary policy adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) beginning in 2012 and the proposal of the European Commission (EC) for the Next Generation EU mark a significant loosening of the rigid regime provided by artt. 122-25 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Are the steps taken by the ECB and the EC only the consequences of exceptional circumstances or will they endure beyond the crisis? Do you consider these steps to be positive or negative?

Giulio Tremonti: I think the current proposals are necessary but not sufficient or conclusive measures for coping with the crisis. I would flag the need to go back in history to reflect on the architecture of the European project.

When the Euro was established by means of the 1998 agreements, two statesmen masterminded the deal: Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president Jacques Chirac. Their views reflected a political agenda born in the early 1990s (which was still supported by Chirac after 1995), at the time Germany was reunified, a phenomenon that triggered a French willingness to have a larger Euro area so that it would not be alone in a potentially unequal partnership with Germany. Achieving this political objective meant there was no space for a two-speed Europe, and Italy and others, despite their public finances not being in the same position as those of the stronger partners, were allowed to participate from the very beginning of the project. The political decision of both the German and French leadership to push for a single Europe, a single market, and a single currency approach, implied a belief that the EU would inevitably continue to move toward closer political integration and allowed the Euro to materialize as it was conceived.

Against this perspective, the pledges made under the Stability and Growth Pact seemed enough to ensure a progressive convergence of the European economies. Unfortunately, when, due to a number of recent crises, but also to the failure to create a common political architecture, Europe as a political project stalled, so did the convergence of the economies.

I think the real question here is whether or not the European partners continue to envision a political project (which cannot be reduced merely to the articles of the current TFEU). If they do, we should discuss the future, keeping in mind that TFEU is the result of a hope for a political perspective, and, by definition, should not be considered binding if that perspective is no longer relevant.

Enrico Letta: I would like to answer the question by going straight to the point. First, the policy is positive, and second, it was adopted because of the crisis but must become structural at the European level. What happened between May and [continua..]